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Abstract: We introduce tools to capture the dynamics of three different pathways, in which
the synchronization of human decision-making could lead to turbulent periods and contagion
phenomena in financial markets. The first pathway is caused when stock market indices, seen as
a set of coupled integrate-and-fire oscillators, synchronize in frequency. The integrate-and-fire
dynamics happens due to “change blindness”, a trait in human decision-making where people have
the tendency to ignore small changes, but take action when a large change happens. The second
pathway happens due to feedback mechanisms between market performance and the use of certain
(decoupled) trading strategies. The third pathway occurs through the effects of communication and its
impact on human decision-making. A model is introduced in which financial market performance has
an impact on decision-making through communication between people. Conversely, the sentiment
created via communication has an impact on financial market performance. The methodologies used
are: agent based modeling, models of integrate-and-fire oscillators, and communication models of
human decision-making.
Keywords: synchronization; human decision making; decoupling; opinion formation; agent-based
modeling
1. Introduction
Financial markets are generally thought of as random and noisy, beyond an understanding within
an ordered framework. The elusive nature of the markets has been captured in theories like the
efficient market hypothesis, which effectively treats price movements as random. It assumes that the
price movements occurring on a given day constitute a random phenomenon, basically drawn from
some probability distribution, thus describing in probabilistic terms what kind of event one should
expect to happen on a given day. This assumption seems natural and probably has its roots back in
the time when, at the beginning of a working day, people working in finance would turn on their
radio and learn of new financial events (events assumed to be created by some higher authority).
This kind of descriptive framework is also adopted for more modern and general models used in
finance, such as autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) and generalized autoregressive
conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH), which are able to describe many of the stylized facts observed
in empirical data. Instead, socio-finance (Vitting Andersen and Nowak 2013) focuses on non-random
human impacts on price formation in the financial markets, stressing in particular the interaction taking
place between people, either directly through communication, or indirectly through the formation of
asset prices, which will in turn be seen to enable synchronization in decision-making.
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Synchronization in human decision-making, and the impact it could have on financial asset
price formation is not a well understood topic. It is better known in economics, where empirical
studies have shown that international trade partners display synchronization in business cycles.
Dées and Zorell (2011) find that economic integration fosters business cycle synchronization across
countries. A similar production structure is also found to enhance business cycle co-movement.
On the other hand, these authors find it harder to pinpoint a direct relationship between
bilateral financial linkages and output correlation. For other studies of synchronization and
business cycles across countries, see, e.g., (Frankel and Rose 1998; Baxter and Kouparitsas 2005;
Backus et al. 1992). The recent global financial crisis has raised questions about the role that financial
market integration could have on synchronization of business cycles across borders (Rey 2015).
However, very little research has been done on synchronization that is created endogenously by
the financial markets themselves, without there necessarily being any economic cause. However,
such phenomena could be relevant for both the onset and the continuation of a financial crisis
(see, e.g., (Poledna et al. 2014; Aymanns and Georg 2015)). This naturally raises the following question:
could synchronization endogenously created in financial markets spill over into the economy and
thereby cause synchronization in business cycles across borders? It would seem here that it is important
to have a clear framework for understanding such dynamics, and also the conditions for the onset of
synchronization in decision-making.
It should be noted that the term “synchronization” in this article covers a broader phenomenon
than “herding”, a related term often used in the financial literature. In finance, “herding” usually
refers to the simple case where people intentionally copy the behavior of others. It has been suggested
that it is rational to herd (Devenow and Welch 1996). For instance, portfolio managers may mimic the
actions of other portfolio managers just in order to preserve their reputation. It is easier to explain
a failure when everybody else also fails than expose oneself to a failure due to bold forecasts and a
departure from the consensus. For a general review paper on herding, see (Spyrou 2013).
Here, “synchronization” refers instead to the more general and complex case where people don’t
necessarily try to imitate each other’s behavior, but, rather, by observing the same price behavior
or through communication, end up synchronizing their decision-making. From this point of view,
the synchronization described in this article may be closer to the idea of creation of convention put
forward by Keynes (1936).
We note that one quantitative measure of synchronisation cannot possibly describe all aspects of
syncrhonisation, especially since synchronisation can happen on different time scales, and between
individuals, or a group of individuals. In the case with indirect interaction between individuals,
we introduce the so-called decoupling parameter as a measure on synchronisation. In the case of
direct interaction between group of market participants (e.g., between financial markets), we use as a
measure for synchronisation how long a perturbation that begins in one market can propagate. In the
case of direct interaction between agents, we use the tipping point analysis of sentiments, in order to
identify when synchronisation is at its highest level.
Poledna et al. (2014) stress the way regulation policies could increase the amount of synchronized
buying and selling needed to achieve deleveraging, which could, in turn, destabilize the market.
They discuss the new regulatory measures proposed to suppress such behavior, but it is not clear
whether these measures really address the problem. In addition, they show how none of these policies
would be optimal for everyone: risk-neutral investors would prefer the unregulated case with low
maximum leverage, banks would prefer the perfect hedging policy, and fund managers would prefer
the unregulated case with high maximum leverage. Aymanns and Georg (2015) consider instead the
case where banks choose similar investment strategies, which can in turn make the financial system
more vulnerable to common shocks. They consider a simple financial system in which banks decide
about their investment strategy on the basis of a private belief about the state of the world, and a
social belief formed by observing the actions of peers. They show how the probability that banks will
synchronize their investment strategies depends on the relative weighting of private and social belief.
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In the following, we will place the emphasis on the fact that price formation is the result of
human decisions to buy or sell assets. Behind every trade is a human decision, if not through the
direct action of a human, then indirectly through programs that manages algorithmic trading by
computers. Socio-finance (Vitting Andersen and Nowak 2013) treats price formation as a sociological
phenomenon. It considers the dynamics of price formation to be created via either direct or indirect
human interactions. Direct interaction covers the case where individuals or groups of individuals
communicate directly and thereby influence mutual decision-making with respect to trading assets.
At the first level, the individual level, indirect interaction covers the case where a trader submits
an order to buy or sell an asset. The resulting price movement of the asset is observed by other
traders, who may in turn modify their decision-making as a consequence of the price movement of the
asset caused by the initial trade. At the second level, the group level, indirect interaction covers the
case where whole markets await the outcome of pricing in other markets in order to find their own
pricing level.
2. Three Different Ways Synchronization Can Lead to Contagion in Financial Markets
In the following, we will study how synchronization in decision-making can happen for people
trading in financial markets. In the context of the present article, synchronization is defined as a certain
dynamic in decision-making. Synchronization is defined as the dynamics where the decision of an
individual, or groups of individuals, in turn influences the decision-making of other individuals or
groups of individuals. Here, we are considering financial markets, so the decision-making is whether
to buy an asset, to sell an asset, or to do nothing. Two different dynamics will be considered. Either the
dynamics that happen because people communicate (direct interaction) or the dynamics that happen
through and index (indirect interaction). The research question of the different mechanisms, and how
they can be identified and studied are discussed in the following.
2.1. Synchronization through Indirect Interaction of Traders
This section is divided into two parts: indirect interaction of market participants at the individual
level (Section 2.1.1) and indirect interaction of market participants at the collective level (Section 2.1.2).
It should be noted that in this article we only treat indirect interaction of traders through a market
index. Other situations where an indirect interaction would play an important role is, however,
possible. The case where some important global news stories (e.g., terrorism on a global scale like
9/11) could also impact the decision-making of market participants without the need for an interaction
between market participants. Such cases are, however, beyond the scope of the models introduced in
the following.
2.1.1. Synchronization through Indirect Interaction of Individuals: The First Level
What traders have done in the past has a direct influence on the action of traders in the present.
Past buying and selling activities bring the market up to the present level, in which traders have to
decide whether now is an opportune moment to buy or sell. This applies to traders using technical
analysis, as well as traders using fundamental analysis. Technical analysis will give different buy/sell
signals, depending on the exact price history generated by traders in the past, whereas fundamental
analysis will be used by traders to decide whether the price level has become low enough to buy or
high enough to sell.
Thus, as traders take note of what happens in the market and update their trading strategies
accordingly, this will change their future prospects for trade in the market. Therefore, as the markets
evolve, traders’ buying/selling decisions will change, and, as these decisions change, they will thereby
modify the pricing of the market. This feedback loop is illustrated schematically in Figure 1. Note
that here we assume that arbitrage possibilities are exploited instantaneously by the traders. This is
in contrast to, for example, the study by the synchronization of Abreu and Brunnermeier (2002),
where arbitrageurs become sequentially aware of mispricing. In that case, rational arbitrageurs instead
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“time the market” rather than correct mispricing right away. In (Abreu and Brunnermeier 2002),
this was shown to lead to delayed arbitrage, something which is not present in the models described
in this study.
Risks 2018, 6, x FOR PEER REVIEW  4 of 13 
 
their decision-making becomes completely deterministic, independent of what happens next in the 
market. In order to illustrate this point, consider the table below, which is one way of formalizing 
technical analysis trading strategies in a simple table form (Abreu and Brunnermeier 2002, 2003). 
Considering for simplicity only the direction of each of the last market moves, the table below 
predicts, for each possible price history, the next move of the market. The table illustrates one 
technical analysis strategy that uses the last three time periods to make a prediction an  can easily be 
generalize  to any number of periods. 
 
Figure 1. Representation of the price dynamics in the Minority Game (Abreu and Brunnermeier 2002) 
and the $-Game (Abreu and Brunnermeier 2003). Agents first update the scores of all their strategies 
depending on their ability to predict market movements. After the scores have been updated, each 
agent chooses the strategy that now has the highest score. Depending on the price history at that 
moment, this strategy determines which action a given agent will take. Finally, the sum of the actions 
of all agents determines the next price move: if positive, the price moves up, if negative, the price 
moves down.  
Consider now a given market price history, ?⃗?(𝑡) = (010) , at time t, which means that (as 
illustrated in Figure 2) three time periods ago the market went down, then up, and then down. It 
should now be noted that whatever the price movement in the next time period t + 1, the strategy in 
Table 1 will always predict to sell at time period t + 2. Therefore, we don’t need to wait for the market 
outcome at the next time step t + 1 in order to know what the strategy will suggest in the subsequent 
time step: it will always suggest selling at time t + 2. The idea that such dynamics in the decision-
making of technical analysis strategies could be relevant for real markets was suggested in (Andersen 
and Sornette 2003). In the terminology of (Andersen and Sornette 2003), the strategy in Table 1 is said 
to be “one time step decoupled, conditioned on the price history ?⃗?  = (010)”, and denoted 
 𝑎ఓௗ௘௖௢௨௣௟௘ௗ(𝑡). 
We can then divide trading strategies into two different classes: those coupled to the price history 
(i.e., conditioned on knowing ?⃗?(𝑡), so that we cannot know the prediction of 𝑎ఓ௖௢௨௣௟௘ௗ(𝑡) at time t + 2 
before knowing ?⃗?(𝑡 + 1)), and those decoupled from the price history. Considering only the strategies 
actually used by agents to trade at time t, the order imbalance, A(t), can therefore be written, 
𝐴(𝑡)    ≡   𝐴ఓ௖௢௨௣௟௘ௗ(𝑡)  + 𝐴ఓௗ௘௖௢௨௣௟௘ௗ(𝑡), (1) 
where  𝐴ఓ௖௢௨௣௟௘ௗ(𝑡) =  ∑ 𝑎ఓ௖௢௨௣௟௘ௗ(𝑡) is the sum over coupled strategies at time t, and similarly for 
 𝐴ఓௗ௘௖௢௨௣௟௘ௗ(𝑡) =  ∑ 𝑎ఓௗ௘௖௢௨௣௟௘ௗ(𝑡). The condition for certain predictability at time t, two time steps ahead 
is then, 
Figure 1. Representation of the price dynamics in the inority Game (Challet and Zhang 1997) and the
$-Game (Andersen and Sornette 2003). Agents first update the scores of all their strategies depending
on their ability to predict market movements. After the scores have been updated, each agent chooses
the strategy that now has the highest score. Depending on the price history at that moment, this strategy
determines which action a given agent will take. Finally, the sum of the actions of all agents determines
the next price move: if positive, the price moves up, if negative, the price moves down.
Under certain circumstances, it can happen that traders inadvertently end up in a state where
their trading strategies “decouple” from the price history, so that, over the next (few) time step(s),
their decision-making becomes completely deterministic, independent of what happens next in the
market. In order to illustrate this point, consider the table below, which is one way of formalizing
technical analysis trading strategies in a simple table form (Abreu and Brunnermeier 2002, 2003).
Considering for simplicity only the direction of each of the last market moves, the table below predicts,
for each possible price history, the next move of the market. The table illustrates one technical analysis
strategy that uses the last three time periods to make a prediction and can easily be generalized to any
number of periods.
Consider now a given market price history,
→
µ (t) = (010), at time t, which means that
(as illustrated in Figure 2) three time periods ago the market went down, then up, and then down.
It should now be noted that whatever the price movement in the next time period t + 1, the strategy
in Table 1 will always predict to sell at time period t + 2. Therefore, we don’t need to wait for the
market outcome at the next time step t + 1 in order to know what the strategy will suggest in the
subsequent time step: it will always suggest selling at time t + 2. The idea that such dynamics in the
decision-making of technical analysis strategies could be relevant for real markets was suggested in
(Andersen and Sornette 2003). In the terminology of (Andersen and Sornette 2003), the strategy in
Table 1 is said to be “one time step decoupled, conditioned on the price history
→
µ = (010)”, and denoted
adecoupledµ (t).
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→
µ = (010) at time t.
Table 1. Example of a strategy used in the Minority Game (Challet and Zhang 1997) and the $-Game
(Andersen and Sornette 2003). Considering only up (1) and down (0) market price movements,
a strategy issues a prediction for each given price history, here illustrated with price histories over
the last m = 3 days. A prediction of 1 refers to the recommendation of the strategy to buy, whereas a
prediction of −1 is a recommendation to sell.
Price History Prediction
0 0 0 1
0 1 −
0 1 0 1
0 1 1 1
1 0 0 −1
1 0 −1
1 1 0 1
1 1 1 1
We can then divide trading strategies into two different classes: those coupled to the price history
(i.e., conditioned on knowing
→
µ (t), so that we cann t know the prediction of acoupledµ (t) at time t + 2
before knowing
→
µ (t+ 1)), and those decoupled from th price history. Considering ly th strategies
actu lly used by agents to trade at time t, the order imbalance, A(t), can ther fore be written,
A(t) ≡ Acoupledµ (t) + Adecoupledµ (t), (1)
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where Acoupledµ (t) = ∑ a
coupled
µ (t) is the sum over coupled strategies at time t, and similarly for
Adecoupledµ (t) = ∑ a
decoupled
µ (t). The condition for certain predictability at time t, two time steps ahead
is then,
Adecoupledµ (t+ 2) > N/2. (2)
If a majority of market participants implement decoupled strategies, this will ensure a
deterministic future price movement of the market, independently of the choices made by the minority
that adopt coupled strategies.
Inequality (2) gives the condition for synchronization to happen via indirect interaction of
traders through the price formation of an asset. Before considering synchronization in real markets
(Challet and Zhang 1997), one must obviously begin by showing its presence in models, as well as
in experiments. Figure 3 proves the existence of synchronization via decoupling in models like the
Minority Game. This is a somewhat surprising result since, by definition, this type of game doesn’t
support trend-following strategies. For further references covering synchronization in experiments
and markets, see (Challet and Zhang 1997; Andersen and Sornette 2003; Liu et al. 2016).Risks 2018, 6, x FOR PEER REVIEW  6 of 13 
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2.1.2. Synchronization through Indirect Interaction of Groups of Individuals: The Second Level
Having discussed how indirect interaction of individuals through financial indices can lead to
synchronization, let us next consider how the phenomenon can appear through indirect interaction of
groups of individuals. In this case, we consider the reaction of one market to the pricing created in
another market. That is, we consider how a given market (i.e., a pool of traders) reacts to the previous
price formation in another market (created by another pool of traders).
To illustrate this point, consider Figure 4, which shows how significant price movements of large
capital stock indices can have a particular impact on smaller capital stock indices. The figure illustrates
the effect of both a world market return (calculated as a weighted sum of returns of stock indices)
and the US market return on the subsequent price movements of individual stock indices. Using the
open–close return of the U.S. stock market, we see a particularly clear case of a “large-move” impact
across markets: since the Asian markets close before the opening of the U.S. markets, they should
only be able to price in this information when they open the next day. That is, one can consider the
impact in the “close–open” of the Asian markets that follows after an “open–close” of the US market.
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An eventual “large-move” U.S. open–close should therefore have a clear impact on the following
close–open of the Asian markets. Figure 4 shows that this is indeed the case. In contrast, the European
markets are still open when the U.S. market opens up in the morning, so the European markets have
access to part of the history of the U.S. open–close. Any “large-move” U.S. open–close would therefore
still be expected to have an impact on the following close–open of the European markets, but with
larger variation in the response than for the Asian markets, since part of the U.S. move would already
be priced in when the European markets closed. This is seen to be the case.Risks 2018, 6, x FOR PEER REVIEW  7 of 13 
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impacts a given stock exchange, wh reas small returns have random impact. (a) condi ion l probab lity
that the daily return Ri of a given country’s stock market index has th sam sign as the world m rket
retu n; (b) conditional probabil y that the close–open return Ri f a given country’s stock market
index following a U.S. open–close has the sam sign as the U.S. open–close retur (+: European
markets; circles: A ian markets). The figures were c ated using almo t nine years of daily returns
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To see how synchronization can happen across markets, consider the illustration in Figure 5a
below, which shows three Integrate-And-Fire (IAF) oscillators with the same frequency over one time
period (or equivalently one IAF oscillator over three time periods). An IAF oscillator is characterized
by an accumulation (i.e., “integrate”) in amplitude A(t) (e.g., “stress”) over time t, up to a certain
point AC, after which it discharges (i.e., “fires”). IAF oscillator models become complex when the
oscillators are coupled (i.e., the amplitude of one oscillator influences the amplitude of other oscillators),
and have different frequencies (see Figure 5b) and/or thresholds AiC. Peskin (Andersen et al. 2011)
introduced IAF oscillators in neurobiology to describe interactions between neurons, but IAF
oscillators have been introduced in many other contexts. For network studies of IAF oscillators
see, e.g., Bellenzier et al. (2016); Kuramoto (1991); and Bottani (1995). A link between certain types of
integrate-and-fire oscillators and earthquake models has also been noted by, e.g., Corral et al. (1995).
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As mentioned in (Andersen et al. 2011), one can consider each financial market index as
an IAF oscillator that influences other market indices (i.e., other IAF oscillators). The impact,
or “stress”, from index i on index j accumulates up to a certain point, after which it becomes priced in.
The justification for such a behavior can be seen from Figure 4, which shows that small price changes
in index i have no immediate influence on index j (but are assumed to accumulate over time), whereas
large price changes in index i have an impact and thereby become priced into index j.
This can be formalized in the following expression, which expresses the set of stock market indices
worldwide as a set of coupled IAF oscillators:
RI(t) =
1
N∗i
∑ Nj 6=iαijθ(|Rcumij (t− 1)| > RC)× Rcumij (t− 1)βij + ϕij(t), (3)
Rcumij (t) = [1− θ(|Rcumij (t− 1)| > RC)]× Rcumij (t− 1) + Rj(t), j 6= i, (4)
αij = 1− exp [−Kj/(Ki γ
)
]; βij = exp[
−|Zi − Zj|
τ
] (5)
In Label (3), Ri(t) is the return of st ck ind x j, which at time t receives a contribution from stock
index j, whenever the “stress” Rcumij exceeds a certain threshold RC. αij describes the coupling between
the two stock indices, expressed via Label (5) in terms of the relative weight of capitalizations Ki.
A large γ, γ 1, corresponds to a network of the world’s indices dominated by the index with the
largest capitalization Kmax, while a small γ, γ 1, corresponds to a network of indices with equal
strengths, since αij then becomes independent of i and j. In addition, it is assumed that countries that
are geographically close also have greater economic interdependence, as described by the coefficient
βij, where
∣∣zi − zj∣∣ is the time zone difference between countries i and j. τ gives the scale over which
this interdependence declines. Small τ, τ  1, then corresponds to a world where only indices in the
same time zone are relevant for pricing, whereas large τ, τ  1 describes a global influence on the
pricing that is independent of the difference in time zone.
It can be seen from Label (4) that it is the tensor Rcumij that plays the role of an IAF oscillator.
Returns from index j, Rj, accumulate stress on index i by continuously adding to Rcumij , up to a certain
Risks 2018, 6, 104 9 of 13
point,
∣∣∣Rcumij ∣∣∣ > RC, after which the oscillator discharges, Rcumij → 0 , and the stress becomes priced in
via Label (3).
Once the IAF network is in a state of synchronization, contagion effects can be identified
throughout the network. One example is given in Figure 6, showing the propagation of a large
price movement taking place in the Japanese stock market on 23 May 2013. For more examples with
real market data, see (Liu et al. 2017).
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2.2. Synchronization through Direct Interaction of Traders
Synchronization through Direct Interaction of Individuals and Groups of Individuals: The First and
Second Levels
Having discussed how synchronization can emerge through indirect interaction of individuals,
or groups of individuals, via financial market indices, we now consider the case of direct interaction,
that is, ways that decision-making can be influenced by direct communication between people or
groups of people. The idea is to see how discussions among market participants can influence their
decision-making with respect to buying/selling assets, and how this can in turn influence market
performance. We will also show how the market performance itself can be a relevant factor in
the decision-making process, thereby creating another feedback loop between decision-making and
market performance.
To see how this can happen, consider Figure 7A, which shows a population of market participants
with different views of the market. For simplicity, we consider two possible states for these views:
positive, bullish, or negative, bearish. Figure 7A shows an example where half the population is
initially bearish, and the other half bullish. One could, for example, imagine a morning meeting taking
place in a major bank or brokerage house, so, at the beginning of the day, we let people meet and
discuss things in groups of different sizes (Figure 7B). To illustrate how communication between people
can influence their decision-making, consider first the simple case where consensus decision-making is
determined by the majority opinion (Figure 7C). As can be seen in Figure 7D, at the end of the day,
the opinion of the population has changed as a result of their meetings (direct interaction), with only
45% of the population now bullish.
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Figure 7. Changing the “bullishness” in a population via communication in subgroups. (A) at the
beginning of a given day t, a certain percentage B(t) are bullish; (B) during the day communication takes
place in random subgroups of different sizes; (C) illustrates the extreme case of complete polarization
mk,j = ±1 created by a majority decision. In general, mk,j ' j/k corresponds to the neutral case where
opinion remains unchanged on average within a subgroup of size k; (D) due to the communication
in the different subgroups, the “bullishness” at the end of the day is different from what it was at the
beginning of the day. The figure is taken from (Corral et al. 1995).
In the context of decision-making about trading assets in financial markets, it is natural to assume
that market performance itself could influence the decision-making of market participants, while this
could in turn influence future market performance. A model was suggested in (Corral et al. 1995) to
capture this kind of feedback. The main idea is to let market performance influence decision making,
rather than just going by a simple majority rule as illustrated in Figure 7B,C. This is done by assuming
a certain probability for a majority opinion to prevail. Then, under certain conditions, a minority
could persuade a part of the majority to change their opinion. The probability of a majority opinion
prevailing will depend on the market performance over the last time period.
Specifically, let B(t) denote the proportion of bullishness in a population at time t, whence the
proportion of bearishness is 1 − B(t). For a given group of size k with j agents having a bullish opinion
and k − j a bearish opinion, we let mk,j denote the transition probability for all (k) members to adopt
the bullish opinion as a result of their meeting. After one update taking into account communications
in all groups of size k with j bullish agents, the new probability of finding an agent with a bullish view
in the population can therefore be written
B(t+ 1) = mkj(t)Ckj B
j[1− B(t)]k−j, (6)
where
Ckj ≡
k!
j!(k− j)! . (7)
It should be noted that the transition probabilities mk,j(t) depend on time, since we assume that
they change as the market performance evolves.
The link between communication and its impact on the markets can now be taken into account by
assuming that the price return r(t) changes whenever there is a change in the bullishness. It should
now be noted that it is the changes in opinion that matter for the market performance, rather than the
level of a given opinion. Empirical data supporting this idea can be found in (Andersen et al. 2014a,
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2014b), for example. The reasoning behind this is that people having a positive view of the market
would already naturally hold long positions on the market. It is therefore rather when people change
their opinion, say by becoming more negative about the market, or less bullish, that they will have the
tendency to sell. Assuming it to be proportional to the percentage change in bullishness, RB(t), as well
as economic news, ϕ(t), the return r(t) is given by
r(t) =
RB(t)
µ
+ ϕ(t), µ > 0. (8)
Here, ϕ(t) is a Gaussian distributed variable with mean 0, describing a standard deviation that
varies in time as a function of market sentiment:
σ(t) = σ0exp
(
RB(t)
β
)
, σ0 > 0, β > 0. (9)
The impact of market performance on decision-making can then be taken into account by letting
mk,j(t) depend on the market performance according to
mk,j(t) = mk,j(t)exp
(
r(t)
α
)
, α > 0, mkj ≤ 1. (10)
In this way, the transition probabilities for a change of opinion, Label (9), depend directly on the
market return over the last time period. The reasoning behind this dependence is that, if, for example,
the market had a dramatic downturn at the close yesterday, then, in meetings the next morning,
those with a bearish view will be more likely to convince even a bullish majority about their point
of view.
Synchronization in the decision-making due to communication between people can now be
studied via tipping point analysis, for example. Once extreme sentiment B = 0.1 has been created
via synchronization, this can be used to identify a tipping point of the market: when, say, B→ 1 ,
any further increase in B is limited, and this in turn limits further price increases in the market.
However, any negative economic news, ϕ(t), will then lead to a decrease in B(t) through Labels (7) and
(9). The cases B = 0.1 therefore act as reflection points in the model, thereby making it possible to identify
tipping points in the price dynamics of the markets. One illustration of such tipping point dynamics
in real markets is shown in Figure 8, taken from (Andersen et al. 2014b). In (Andersen et al. 2014b),
maximum likelihood methods were used to estimate the parameters of the model, after which an
out-of-sample analysis was performed on the EUBanks index around the time of the financial crisis in
2008. As can be seen in Figure 8a,c, prior peaks, B ∼= 1, in the estimated sentiment do indeed announce
a tipping point in the performance of the index returns.
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3. Discussion
We have introduced three different models from the field of socio-finance to investigate three
different pathways that could lead financial market participants to synchronize their decision-making,
and thereby create a risk of contagious and volatile market phases. One pathway comes about when
stock market indices, seen as a set of coupled integrate-and-fire oscillators, synchronize in frequency.
Another occurs due to feedback mechanisms between market performance and the use of certain
(decoupled) trading strategies. In addition, a third pathway could be brought about by communication
and its impact on human decision-making.
Synchronization is a well-known phenomenon in economics, used to describe the way trading
partners can introduce correlations in business cycles across international borders. The recent global
financial crisis raises the question of the impact of financial market integration on synchronization of
business cycles across borders. Another question is: Can synchronization created endogenously in
financial markets spill over into the economy and thereby cause synchronization in business cycles
across borders? It should be noted that very little research has been done on synchronization that
is created endogenously by the financial markets themselves, without there necessarily being any
economic cause. It is the authors’ hope that the present article will fuel awareness of this topic.
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